114 and, most important of all, what happened if a murder occurred in a
671 market (a place of peaceful commercial exchange, as Blanco points out)
114 on market day (a day of peace, as Blanco again points out). For the
443 clan market, as Blanco makes very clear, set the tone for the relative
182 autonomy of the clan within the framework of the tribe of which it was part; and this was particularly the case amongst the Aith Waryaghar, a fact which Blanco, once again, did not miss. Hence, in his
114 671 682 fine analysis of the 'Qanun of the 'Fraction' of the Aith 'Adhiya' (in LR, pp. 10, 55), Blanco notes, regarding anyone who should commit a murder in the market, that "...all the above-mentioned communities of the Bni 'Adhiya shall unite against him and burn his estate and that of his agnates; they shall drag them from their houses and exact from them one thousand duros as a fine".

114 671 443 182 In his comments on the qanuns of the clans of the Aith Khattab, Aith 'Abdallah and Aith 'Adhiya (all of the Aith Waryaghar), Blanco clearly brings out the fact of the market as the "preferential institution", both economic and social, and as the "temple of tribal law", where the clan councillors or imgharen convened in regular weekly meetings (called agraw) to settle disputes. Thus the jural aspect of the traditional Rifian market. Market day, in the Rif, absolutely had to be the one day of peace during the week, for if the market was "broken" through fighting and murder, the cry went up: "Now there is no law!" (Ur iddji shi r-haqq!) And this phrase, as Blanco graphically says, was "repeated in the humble dwellings perched on the mountain slopes; and soon the Rifian mountains returned to their harsh, restless and agitated life, as the bloody phantasmagoria of vengeance reappeared

114 on the hillsides, bringing the cries of victims and the echo of rifle
671 shots in its train" (LR, p. 19). Blanco's work is shot through with
443 references to the clan (or, as he calls it, fraccion), with its mar-
•182 ket, as the basic Rifian patria - which of course applies better to large tribes like the Aith Waryaghar than to small ones like the Thafarsith, "Rifian Switzerlands" surrounded by more powerful neighbors.

114 By 1960, some of the finer points of the Rifian qanuns or Cus-
671 tomary Law documents had been forgotten even by members of the oldest
[681] living generation, e.g., such as how much is to be paid if one shoots at a man and misses him, or if one threatens him with a dagger, but
114 does not stab him. Blanco, and to a lesser extent Carleton Coon[28],
127 have both set down many of these common-law niceties; and Blanco's
[671] work has the additional merit (and we refer here primarily to LR) of being a translation and an analysis of primary documents, some dating as far back as the mid-eighteenth century. These are invaluable source materials for the long and unbroken period of the Rifian 'Ripublik' (as opposed to 'Abd al-Krim's Dawla Jumhuriya Rifiya, or "Rifian Republican State", 1921-1926, although he only constituted it "officially" early in 1923), which is today only a memory and, according to some, a skeleton in the Rifian closet. However, old tribesmen and even some younger ones who are less sophisticated - and who therefore generally make better informants - still grudgingly admit to admiring it and to looking upon it with nostalgia.

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[113] 28--Cf. Carleton S. Coon, Tribes of the Rif, Harvard African Studies, Vol. IX, Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum, 1931. Coon's data on customary law come primarily from the tribe of the Igzinnayen, whereas the bulk of Blanco's come from their northern neighbors, the Aith Waryaghar.

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2) (The author's) concept of "groups": a) group of blood ties (i.e. kin group)--family jajgu or "ascending ramus" (read "lineage branch")[20] and dharfiqth or "family group" (read "lineage"); b) social group--jma'ath: "fraction" or canton [21] (khums, rba')[22] and tribe or dhaqbitsh; c) political group--liff or alliance; d) religious group--tariqa or religious brotherhood, and murabitic families (saints); and e) economic group--rural lands and property: storehouses[23], markets, Jews, "beneficial institutions"[24].

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Rifians are thus grouped into three "associations" (i.e. levels) of kin groups: 1) hearth or (nuclear) family or dhaddarth[25]; 2) "ascending ramus" or jajgu (lineage branch); and 3) "family group" or dharfiqth (patrilineage).

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3) The Nuclear Family or Hearth:--This is formed by the union of a man, a woman and their (unmarried) children, and it should be looked at from both the conjugal and filial standpoints. From a

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conjugal standpoint, it may be composed of a man and his four wives (and unmarried children). But Rifians are polygynous only in theory; in practice, only the well-to-do (such as shaikhs) are polygynous, and even they seldom have more than two wives. A poor man only tends to take a second wife if he has to, if, for example, he has divorced the first one for not bearing him any sons. The function of polygyny

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is to produce sons in order to prevent the extinction of the family in a society where the major law is "that of the strongest"[26], as well as to produce a sufficient number of male children to take care of agricultural tasks. "Oriental sensuality" is not a factor here, in any way.

613 a single dharfiqth may contribute to the formation of several jma'th-s.
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623 even in different tribes. And thus the jma'th of Aith Waryaghar is an agglomeration of dharfiqin without known relationship to each other.[63]

623 The iziddjifen have well-defined functions within the above
613 groups (e.g. jajgu and dharfiqth), such as the distribution of work,
[596] payment and benefits (barley to the fqih, rations to the poor, reception of guests, fines, irrigation turns, participation in communal property, etc.), and formation of the opinion which their delegate to the outside world has to express, as well as support for him in the viewpoints he is to maintain. The iziddjifen, as representative of the dharfiqin, are the primordial element in the "play" of the jma'th.

D) Position of Women:

562 A Kabyle can do what he likes with his wife except make her
182 a corpse, while a Rifian considers her as precious coin in the can-
171 cellation of blood debts, and a Berber from the Atlas Mountains regards her as a precious offering in his request for an alliance[64], when the insecurity of the social grouping made it mandatory to look for friends to reinforce it.

562 The sad (Blanco's term) condition of women is most clearly
627 revealed in reprisal and in the norms which regulate it, such as
628 their devaluation, pre-Islamic in character (sic), revealed through the exemption from the act of vengeance of a husband who kills his wife;...North Africa is an area where women can be killed, and the blood-price (Arabic diya, Rifian ddiyith) is half that for a man.....

623 immaterial; for a jma'th which formerly contained only two dharfiqin
613 may now have three, four or five, and tomorrow even more, with a
621 proportionate increase in houses and rifles. What the jma'th is not, however, is a family group united by blood ties--it is not a dharfiqth.

623 .....The jma'th came into being because of the necessity of common
182 usufruct of elements essential to sustain life, such as water, pasture
621 lands, brushwood, etc., and because of the necessity of regulating relations, both material and spiritual, with one's neighbors (hence mosques, which come into being after such an association has been effected). The result was that when a group for any reason abandoned its original jma'th in order to establish itself elsewhere--insofar as its growth and development made it do so, it cut off relationships with its parent group and its point of origin to constitute a new and independent nucleus[71].

621 Many Rifians confuse dharfiqth with jma'th, and proof of this
623 is that when one asks the members of a given group where they are
613 from, it is the same to them to answer "From such and such a jma'th"
[829] or "From such and such a dharfiqth", because the dharfiqth in question forms part of the jma'th whence they originated. Jma'th has a geographical connotation, while dharfiqth smells of nomadism (sic)[72]. This also explains why in different places one may find jma'th-s having the same name but formed by different dharfiqin, because over the course of time other splinter-groups from other jma'th-s became associated with the initial splinter-group from the first jma'th.....

621 I am dubious about the value of the number of households as a cri-
623 terion in definition; but I think that the best single datum available
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latter are an incommensurable force in which both the individual and/or the group(s) to which he belongs may take refuge...Thus, if the clan has a geographic character[83], its primary distinguishing features are its customary law, its qanuns and its market (as in the qanum of the Wednesday Market of Sidi Bu 'Afif, which marks the jurisdiction of this market and the men who admit the same and arrange their lives in accordance with it--see La Ley Rifeña, 2a Parte, pp. 59-68).

4) Tribe or Dhaqbitsh: The tribe is the highest-level form of clan association (i.e. a tribe is made up by a given number of clans or maximal segments). The function of a tribe, also, has on this level been transformed into that of maintaining interclan equilibrium (i.e. the theory of segmental balance and opposition), which is guided by the same norms as within each clan, and if it actually has no overall customary law common to it as a single unit[84], it nonetheless forces...any of its delinquent members to rectify any errors, faults or mistakes he may make, but always in accordance with the law of his clan. Thus we may observe that, within the tribes, their clans form two balanced and equilibrated lfuf (pl. of liff), or liffs, as the tribes, on their own level, do in turn[85], and as even the dharfiqin of a given jma'th do, two, three or four rungs down the ladder. It would seem to be these liffs which have always served to watch over and maintain the continued existence of the "fractions" and tribes, while at the same time having been responsible for a fierce opposition to penetration of the area on the part of the Makhzin (both Moroccan and Spanish)...If the jma'th is the secondary school of Rifian democracy, the "fraction" is its high school and its tribe the university.

c) the aith(th)arba'in, or "people of the forty"[107], delegates representing the clan in the tribal council or agrau, which convened when circumstances required it (danger external to the clan or to the tribe, or murder). In theory, there were eight delegates from each khums (in tribes, which, like Aith Aryaghar were divided into five khmas), but they were given the same name even if they totaled less than forty.[108]

d) the amghar n-suq, or "market chief"[109], a person who by virtue of his position or energy took care, with his kinsmen, of policing the market, of small incidents which might occur within it, etc.

e) the abarrah, or market crier.[110]

f) the amarras, or silo guardian (in the Eastern Rif only).

G) Free Professions (fragmentary):

a) Low Class Public Functionaries: criers and weighers in markets.

b) Free Professions: merchants, healers, weavers, carpenters and masons.

c) Lowest Scale: musicians and dancers.[111]

d) Ibarudiyen: real imqqranen, possibly the most highly regarded ones in the tribe. Invited to feasts, they enacted scenes of war. Generally, two of them faced each other and improvised dialogue, while firing off their rifles[112]. These ibarudiyen were the Rifian counterpart of dramatic actors; and even in this simple detail of lack of

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organization, as in the settlement morphology and house distribution of their communities, we may discern the state of disintegration which the Rifian "republics" had attained, the individual rapaciousness of each one and the anarchy of its component parts.

Diagram of Rifian Social Structure[113]

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We see in this graphic representation of the principal units in Rifian social structure how these units are originated in the lineages (Sp. original, grupos familiares) whose three ascending categories of nuclear family (Sp. or hogar, R. nubth), lineage branch (jajgu) and lineage proper (dharfiqth), with genealogical relationship as their distinguishing characteristic, form the roots or base of the Rifian arch, as diagrammed here. On reaching ground level (in an upward direction), they become transformed into three other (larger) social units whose distinctive features are expressed above and the apex of which is the tribe (dhaqbitsh), which is bound together with its autonomous institutional parts by the institutional apex of the agrau, or tribal council, the maximal assembly in the region. This arch gives us an idea of the (relative) independence (autonomy?) of its columns, representing clans sustained by the nuclei of jma'ths; and all this gives us also an idea of the whole and of the harmony reigning between this whole and its different parts, of its consistency, of its solidity, and of the importance of all these factors.

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These jma'ths, the internal lives of which were regulated by the custom governing the original mountain jma'th, continued as tributaries of the latter[133], enjoying the benefits of such a status (participation in the collection of fines, contributions to the fqih)[134] until, as we have seen, the new nucleus, beginning to stand out more and more as a result of its growth, importance and distance from the parent jma'th, succeeded in emancipating itself from the latter through its own discords and ambitions.[135]

But it is difficult to determine at precisely what moment the new jma'th came of age, as it is to determining everything else, even including finding out the designations in nomenclature of its representatives. This designation is not that of amin, as among the Kabyles of Algeria, a word which, taken over from Arabic, is one which does not permit a confusion of its administrative significance, an individual function, with that of the jma'th, which has a collective mqaddim, a term also adopted from Arabic and employed by certain Berber groups in the Western Atlas, for the personage of the mqaddim also has that function as well as the inadmission of that of the shaikh, which more than one person in Aith Waryaghar attributes to himself and which figures even in documents. These terms, however, do not demonstrate any more than the anarchy which the people have attained, and the forgetting of their own racial (sic!) characteristics[136]; as such words among Rifians can have no meaning nor can they be given any importance greater than those of "colonel" and "doctor" in the South American republics. These are strange nicknames (sic), for to the Rifian, as to any Berber, they say nothing if they are to be considered

typical terms, like that of amghar, since the institution of the Aitharba'in, formerly an authentic democratic power, seems to have depreciated and is now dormant.

The traditional Rifian jma'th according to my way of thinking and to the results of my own investigations, is not limited to an administrative unit, but was rather the essential administrative, gubernatorial and judicial organ. The jma'th was the sovereign, such a wide concept, such an interesting collective entity and so little known to me that if I tried to define it precisely, now, at the present state of my knowledge, I would imagine the results to be erroneous.

Regarding the geographical regions considered in the order listed above, the Aith Waryaghar are reduced to three, which correspond approximately to the three qa'idates into which the tribe is divided: the region of the plan or the Qa'idate of l-Uta; the valley of the Upper Nkur River, or Qa'idate of the Nkur; and the valley of the Upper Ghis River, or Qa'idate of the Ghis[137]. Any other administrative division which might be made would not correspond with the same precision to the topography of Aith Waryaghar, for, in its geographical synthesis, this tribe is nothing more than the Ghis-Nkur watershed. If a greater fractionizing does not seem necessary from a geographical viewpoint, in order to maintain the subdivision of the tribe in its six present clans, five of them of ancient lineage and the sixth, that of the Jbil, imposed by necessity[138], with a shaikh at the head of each one because of the large territorial area which it covers, larger in some cases than that of other whole tribes, it is

This internal equilibrium between dharfiqin was maintained, more than by the play of (within) the jma'th, by the liff alliance system which, linking tribes, clans, communities and lineages into two rival bands, created the miracle of permitting the existence of minuscule units of this type amongst others more powerful, although the clarification of this point would take us further away from our present intentions.

Security in external relations was attained by the connection with the upper-level units, clan and tribe, and verified by means of their representatives and the contingents of armed men which on special occasions they had to send as irregular tribal troops in a harka, which defended group interests in any revolts or fratricidal struggles.

The representatives of the jma'th in its external relations are locally known by the name of ingharen, and more commonly by the Arabized term aitharbi'in (the forty: sic), because each khums (one-fifth of the tribe) generally provided eight representatives (sic)[10]. These men of the aitharbi'in were generally accompanied by an escort of aith amzzyan (or aith umzzyan?)[11] who officiated both as advisers and as witnesses to the agraw or council meeting where questions of common interest were aired and examined.

When these questions necessitated armed expeditions outside the unit concerned, the (manpower) quota which each jma'th had to provide

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10--This makes a neat mathematical model, but in practice it is based upon a false premise, as it has been demonstrated previously that the term aitharbi'in refers in fact to "representatives of the people" and that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the notion of "forty".

11--The concept of aith umzzyan or imzzyanen, "little ones", "minors", as participants in the Rifian political system is, again, erroneous. It is only in the present paper that Blanco introduces the concept in this fashion.

721 621 613 was imposed by the tribe or the clan: it was based on distribution amongst the several dharfiqin comprising the jma'th in question, while the place and date where and when they had to present themselves was communicated to them by the leader of the expedition, who also examined cases of exemption and desertion.

Thus, both in theory and in reality, all the operations of recruitment of our European municipalities were incumbent upon the jma'th; while relief and provisions, the personal and complementary obligation of the dharfiqth, were sometimes assumed by the jma'th when the earlier operations failed, as a kind of advance.

721 182 This natural system, alleviating the principal one of a number of onerous chores which are discharged by (military) services in European bureaucracies, permitted the Rifians to give their full attention both to military operations and to politics. It bound all of them together, the front and the rearguard, in a common interest, principally economic, which in lieu of discipline was what reinforced local spirit. The economic interest (the saving of ammunition in combat and sobriety in eating--for the individual had to pay for both out of his own pocket), apart from avoiding not a little dissatisfaction and worry, afforded the harka a high degree of addiction to rapine, given the fact that its members had to live on their own account in enemy territory in order to compensate for the woebegone consignments of the wretched rearguard, justifying through its well-known raids its desire to fill its stomach, the clearest of all its bellicose undertakings. Such that, once the booty was obtained, the harka was dissolved on more than one occasion.

726 strength of those who were first on the spot, and so that the points which were most threatened could be easily and quickly reinforced. [182] [701] The dissemination of contingents was imposed by geographical factors (i.e. by the extreme poverty of an area which is excessively compartmented and rought country), by political ones (i.e. lack of a single head at the top of the chain of command other than individuals of purely local prestige, and a recruitment system which set limits on the employment of large units) and even by technical ones (i.e. the European notion of reducing the defense of fixed points of strategic interest, as well as in finding them, is difficult for Riians to assimilate, for they themselves merely wait in their hilltop houses, etc.)[8].

C) Rifian Alliances (fragmentary):

619 628 181 [602] The Rif was a mosaic of independent tribes, gnawed at by internal disputes in an inhospitable land. It was a powder-keg of individual personalities who placated misfortunes with more misfortunes, with misery, envy and egotism; each one of these men were followed by minuscule groups of kinsmen and partisans, with no tie greater to oppose an invader than their own ambition and convenience....

619 There was in the Rif, however, a certain internal equilibrium by which small tribes like the Targist, Thafarsith and Aith Wurishik[9] could persist, even though surrounded by powerful neighbors.

619 616 [648] Alliances seem the logical and necessary step to which the Rifians had recourse when threatened by superior powers, such as that of the Sultans. The main significance of alliances lies in defense against a common danger, as well as in its concomitant, mutual aid;

619 but in the Rif, alliances were limited to the practical idea of the
616 defense of the Rifians' own interests, for neither their religion nor
their political system nor any other abstract notion or value or in-
[181] stitution, great or small, was the cause. Islam, independence and
security were the trinity to which the whole little Rifian world[10]
administered its sacrament as only spiritual appetite, desire for
coexistence in free and minuscule republican units[11], and security of
619 property and persons....The regular functioning of its structure, with
616 its trilateral organization of blood, family ties (marriage; jajgu or
● 182 branch; and dharfiqth or trunk[12]) and social units (jma'th, clan and
dhaqbitsh) and institutions (communal and religious services[13],
markets and qanun), could never have been justified alone, because the
Rifians needed to take refuge in a complementary system of alliances,
which they would do until another more powerful force from outside,
such as a relatively strong and centralized Makhzin, succeeded in re-
ducing such a function to smoldering embers.

Rifian alliances were thus the refuge of individuals or groups
when the norms of coexistence were broken or when the danger of in-
dividual or group preponderance surged up within a social unit, threaten-
616 ing its equilibrium. The alliance which originated in the rivalries
619 between kin groups rose up to clan and even tribal levels, and in some
[614] instances it could even spread beyond tribal borders to extend itself
616 over the whole area. In this way the two great enemy groups of Sanhaja
619 and Ghumara came into being; and although they are to a large extent
648 confused recollections in the minds of old men[14], the latter also
173 bring to life, through their descriptions, the voracious conflagrations

616 619 648 173 616 619 182 into which a minute initial event (i.e. the cause of the war) had developed, while the echo of gunshots and the splendors of vengeance lit up the Rifian mountain landscape....The Rifian alliance is established as a precaution taken by a weak man faced by the dangers of disequilibrium within the social group of which he is a member, and it comes into play when the norms of coexistence are broken....When one studies life in the dispersed hamlets of the Rif, one sees at once how personal ambition and rival interests could, in the last analysis, break up their inhabitants and realign them into two or three rival bands[15] of more or less equal strength. When there are three such 616 619 bands[16], one of them acts as a buffer or cushion between the other two in order to maintain equilibrium and to prepare for the worst through alliance with neighboring villages or groups. This also happens with clans, and even with tribes.

[829] All of native science in the difficult art of government resides in a perfect knowledge and evaluation of these bands and of the rivalries which separate them in their own rich personal experience.... A great many tribal wars may be explained through the preference of one band, in a system of equilibrium of forces and balance of power, and through the logical reaction of the opposite band, which considered itself underestimated or slighted! The personalities and moving spirits in each band are also a factor to be considered[17].

616 621 [602] Ordinarily the people in a village group themselves into two opposed bands of equal strength. When there are three such bands or if equilibrium is for any reason upset, the foresight of the weak obliged them to ally themselves with family groups in neighboring villages, thus giving rise to the linkages[18] discussed earlier.

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[182] Individual liffs bind together individuals or families, persons and possessions, and make for solidarity in the payment of fines, in both defense and attack[21].

2) General Liff:--I think the raison d'etre of the general liff to be purely defensive. These large-scale liffs are real military [619] alliances brought about in order to maintain territorial integrity, and it is they which have permitted the coexistence of minuscule tribes alongside of large and powerful ones. The situation in this respect is analogous to that of Switzerland in Europe; and among the most typical Switzerlands in the Rif are the Thafarsith and the Aith 'Ammarth[22].....In a general liff, it is not individual or kin group interests which are in opposition to each other and come into play, but rather the jurisdictional limits and the autonomy of the social [613] groupings (i.e. clans) which integrate them. The general liff obligates with the same end and binds together with the same strength [171] the individuals belonging to rival dharfiqin. There is thus, I think, a notable difference in the two classes of liffs, although the end result or defensive spirit is the same[23]; analogously, there are alliances between European nations which are destined to preserve their independence, as well as friendships of more of an individual or econ- [562] omic character between their members....The national liff, to call it thus, cannot be confused with the social forms which have already been considered above, for while the latter place mutual obligations upon and bind together individuals and lands, the general liff usually applies only to men and binds together only warriors[24].

616 The jma'th, the clan and the tribe, in spite of swamping
614 their territory with the blood of their brothers and fellow members,
619 are invariably and unchangingly preserved, for the desire of expansion
[621] on the part of their neighbors was always held in check by a tremendous fear of the liff, whose mysterious strength was never known pre-
616 viously[25]....And here we have a strange game or interplay between these
182 two types of liff, for while the individual type, with its sanguinary
628 feuds with neighbors, tends toward the disintegration of the social units involved, the general type remains permanent and intact, tending to neutralize or localize the hatreds which the quarrels of the individual type can engender.[26]

648 As today (1935) the central power (i.e. the Spanish Protec-
692 torate or Makhzin) is strong enough to put individual and group disputes
616 up to arbitration, guaranteeing the enjoyment of his or their rights
182 to each person or group involved, the general liffs are disappearing and the individual ones are weakening; but in my opinion, if any real commotion began, liff alliances would surge up anew, even though today they exist largely in the minds of old men.[27]

616 Robert Montagne, in Les Berbères et le Makhzen (p. 216), says of all this:

> "When we study the existence of little elementary societies, we are struck both by the tyranny exercised by the group over the individual and by the impotence of the former to keep away from anarchy. The liffs materialize and project on ground level, we might say, the two opposite and complementary tendencies of Berber life: the spirit of association and the taste for discord."

My own feeling on the matter, however, is that the liff system is the complement of the other two types of unity, family and kin group

619 brake or check upon the expanding hunger of neighbors as well as upon the hegemony of some determined individual.

175 But with the threat of the Rogi, Bu Hmara[31], expressed in
619 the form of the mhalla or military expedition under the command of Jilali Mul al-Wudhu[32] (Muludu), we see the Aith Waryaghar reacting violently and uniting, for the first time in their history, as the result of an agraw at Imzuren, nominating their war chief, mounting guard on the line of resistance parallel to the Nkur River, from Imnudh (in the Aith Bu 'Ayyash) to the Mediterranean, and joyfully accepting the hard task, magnificently performed, of smashing Bu Hmara's army to bits and sending it back in headlong retreat to Qasba Silwan.

619 In the same way, we also see the khums of Aith 'Abd Allah,
616 in liff with the Ibuqquyen, joining the other khmas of Aith Waryaghar
175 to fight against that tribe, as auxiliaries in the punitive expedition of Bushta al-Baghdadi[33]; and thus we see that tribal interests were always superior to clan ones[34].

616 For this reason, the mechanism of the liff is simply con-
● 182 servative and not disintegrative, as might seem the case from other points of view. If in the jma'th it equalizes the forces which are
[621] feuding, it does the same in the tribe with the rival clans, and in
[619] the overall Rifian area with hostile tribes, everywhere balancing the
[614] inferiority of weak groups with the strength of its own men. It may be possible to explain in this fashion why in spite of the feverish, ephemeral and unlucky vicissitudes of such minuscule states, they never came to the point of disappearing altogether, while at the same time and by the same token they never permitted the duration of empires

or similar agglomerates. This might also perhaps explain the persistence in disorder up to exhaustion point, for thanks to an obscure family feud, a chain reaction would unleash violence throughout the whole region as fast as a burning cigarette can produce a forest fire[35].

There is no doubt that through their origins the tribes can be classified into two great groups, Sanhaja and Ghumara, which formed the two great Rifian alliances of the same names, and between which the Rifian tribes were distributed in an apparent equilibrium, as follows[36]:

Ghumara: Ibuqquyen, Aith Yittuft, Aith 'Ammarth, Mtiwa dyal Bhar (Mtiwa of the Sea), Ghmara Proper (Bni Rzin, Bni Khalid, Bni Silman, Bni Zjil, Bni Buzra, Bni Mansur, Bni Grir, Bni Smih and Bni Ziyat), Bni S'aid (of the Jbala, not the Rifian tribe of Aith S'aid), Bni Zarwal, Bni Zarwal, Bni Winjil, Slas, Hiyaina, Branis, Igzinnayen[37], Marnisa, Mtiwa dyal Uta (Mtiwa of the Plain), Bni Mstara and Ghzawa.

Sanhaja: Bni Bu Frah, Bni Gmil, Mistasa[38], Aith Waryaghar, I-Khmas, Bni Waryagil[39], Jaya, Mzzyat, Rgiwa, Dsul, Khuna, and Sanhaja Srir (Ktama, Aith Siddat, Aith Khannus, Taghzut, Aith Hmid, Aith Bshir, Aith Bu Nsar and Bni Bu Shibt).

However, it seems somewhat limited to attribute the basis of Rifian political preferences and the reason for alliances in the region to this dim and garbled tradition of the very distant past[40]. If, on the other hand, the form of government or religion were in dispute, it would be easier to explain its affinities to the European type[44]. Furthermore, if we discard as vaguely traditional such causes of union

[This should read "41" not "44"--Analyst]

616 619 642 114 the Rifians borrowed a European word, republik, to describe the political organization of their country before 'Abd al'Krim's time, and even though they say that they employed this word because there was no central government, no makhzin, only imgharen or councilmembers acting in a state of "organized acephaly", we must not assume, for instance, that republik to a Rifian means what republic means to an American or republique to a Frenchman. Furthermore, though the American and French definitions of the term are no doubt closer to each other than either or both of them are to the Rifian, we cannot even assume that they are the same. And one of Blanco's most persistent defects in his analysis of social structure is a constant tendency to try to put square pegs into round holes.

616 619 182 601 829 [191] 12--Blanco's comparison of a jajgu to a branch of a tree (which, in fact, it actually means) and of dharfiqth to the trunk, e.g. a branch of a lineage with the lineage itself, is a comparison that Rifians themselves very frequently make. An anthropologist beginning work in the area, is always told by his informants, if he is perplexed by the intricacies of segmentary systems, to compare a tribe with a tree: trunk, major branches, minor branches growing out of these, still smaller branches, and, finally, leaves. The notion of "family trees" is just as firmly rooted in tribal Islam as in the Western World, perhaps more so.

000 13--What Blanco refers to in this very European expression is, among other things, attendance at the noon prayer on Fridays in the mosque.

[114] [191] 14--Where Montagne committed a grave error was in his assumption that Rifian alliances work exactly the same way as the checkerboard system which he found in the Western Atlas, and of which, oddly enough, the almost hypothetical Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs in Northern Morocco also seem to have been a good example. Blanco did not fall into quite the same error, but like Montagne, he takes the Sanhaja-Ghumara liffs at their face value, and accepts them entirely.

15--In the original, bando, which is not a bad description. The liffs of a given tribe are, in fact, hostile moieties, and regarding this conceptualization of them, and the notion of balance, equilibrium and oscillation between them, see Hart, op. cit., 1958, pp. 204-6, note 44.

[614] 16--The notion that there can be more than two liffs within a clan or within a tribe may not, in fact, be beyond the realm of possibility; but the point is academic, for the end result is, no matter how one arrives at it, always two liffs. For example, clans A and B are at war, while C, D and E remain neutral. C and D, however, are hostile to each other, so that if A should ask C's aid, D will automatically join B. After this, ideally, E will split in half, one half joining A's liff and the other, B's, in order to keep the balance and symmetry complete.

17--Almost always, in the shifting liffs within clans, each liff took the name of its most powerful man; and sometimes this happened on the tribal level as well, though it was less frequent.

616 621 602 114 18--The concept of linkage is basic to an understanding of the functioning of Rifian liffs, as Blanco indicates. He does not, however, go

616 another (and/or alternative) division of the Aith Waryaghar into two
619 top-level segments. This division is above and beyond that of the
khmas, and it was dictated to the writer by the late Qa'id Haddu n Muh
[124] Amzzyan of Aith Bu 'Ayyash, a man whose knowledge of his own tribe was considered by his fellows to be unrivalled. In this division, Top Segment I is labeled Aith Khattab, and consists of Aith Yusif w 'Ari (plus Aith 'Ari) and Aith 'Abd Allah, while Top Segment II consists of Aith Bu 'Ayyash (with Aith 'Adhiya) and Aith Hadhifa. If the subsegments of these top segments are aligned into their component liffs, as above, the balance of power is completely even. The primary key to the problem, therefore, is the khums of Imrabdhen, the presence of which,
616 in the Aith Waryaghar, tips the scale in favor of Faction B (above).
619 The Imrabdhen, as their name indicates, are the major intrusive element
614 in the tribe, a holy clan in a lay tribal unit, so to speak. Tradition
792 has it that the ancestor of a major Imrabdhen lineage branch, Sidi Mhand
u-Musa, married a daughter of one of the top imgharen of the Aith Yusif
[613] w 'Ari; and thus the alliance between them. It was highly beneficial to both parties because the Imrabdhen received the protection of the laymen of Faction B, so to speak, while the latter derived prestige from having holy men in residence. In time, with the proliferation of the Imrabdhen, the latter came to acquire the status of a khums, and their subsegments spread out over much of the length and breadth of the tribal territory, forming islets, as it were, in the land of the remaining clans, so that today, although they are regarded as a single top segment, their own subsegments are territorially discontinuous, just as Aith Turirth, Timarzga and Aith 'Arus are in relation to their "brothers" of Aith Yusif w 'Ari, Aith 'Ari and Aith Hadhifa, respectively.

In time, also, the majority of the Imrabdhen came to fight among
[613] themselves, and only a very few (such as the lineage of the Iziqqiwen of Aith Hishim, the direct descendants of Sidi Mhand u Musa, himself in turn a direct descendant of the clan's apical ancestor, Sidi Ibrahim al-A'raj, and the lineage of the Dharwa n Sidi r-Hajj Mis'aud in Aith Turirth) retained the traditional occupations and prerogatives of holy men: the wearing of white robes, the adjudication of disputes, and the dispensing of baraka (which, it might be added, could only be inherited
614 by one son of any given holy man at a time). In the overall, permanent
616 liff alignment within the Aith Waryaghar, however, they did not waver
182 in their allegiance to the Aith Yusif w 'Ari. We are thus faced with
792 the paradox that although functionally they helped, as holy men, to restore or maintain equilibrium within the tribe, they created at the same time a structural disequilibrium by virtue of being, literally, "fifth wheels"--for such a relationship as exists between the segmentary and liff systems of the Aith Waryaghar is tenuous and non-integrative, as, in effect, it adds two and two together and makes five. (It is also possible to draw a similar analogy, in terms of balance and imbalance, between holy and adjudicating imrabdhen, the 10% minority, and lay and warrior imrabdhen, the 90% majority, although this is essentially another matter. So, in fact, is the problem of the "legitimacy" of the Imrab-
614 dhen as a clan: whether they are shurfa or not--and here again, one
792 runs into ambiguities. They themselves say "yes", while others say "no". In general, their genealogies seem to indicate that they are genuine shurfa, although it is possible that these are, at least in part, cleverly faked. Perhaps a test question here is whether or not they have a right to share in the annual proceeds of the sunduq or box

B) Commentary:

671 •182 We have here a curious (sic) type of qanun, which, as we read it, reveals the decomposition which Rifian society had reached, the atomism to which its tribal anarchy led, the imperfection, or rather, the inefficacy, of its laws, the irregular coexistence, the demonstration of its independence.

628 613 728 The disputes between two lineages of the Aith Waryaghar threaten to exterminate them through the chain of blood-vengeance in the face of the indifferent attitude of their constituents, who are habituated to taking justice into their own hands in order to defend their own interests. Two rival groups of equal size attain, in their ferocious and persistent struggle, an equal number of losses, and they reach a stage of weariness, a moment of lassitude happily exploited in order to initiate a treaty of peace (author's italics), which will permit them to build up their resources; and this fact leads them to establish this agreement for one year. Those who will [686] see to it that the truce is kept are the shiyukh, to whose protection they submit and who are interested in the affair because of the inducement of the fine which the group must pay, if within this minimal space of time it contravenes what has been agreed upon in any way (author's italics).

671 613 628 728 554 This society lacks a strong executive power; it looked instinctively toward the web of lineages represented through its shiyukh or old chiefs (sic) (no one should believe that this title represented a step in any framework of governmental or judicial power) for a force which was neutral to its feuds and more powerful than itself, to which

671 613 628 728 554 by such a simple and voluntary act it was converted at the same time to an arbiter of incidents and an executor of decisions. The function is not gratuitous as in modern states, for if in the latter the contributor pays indirectly, he does so directly in the Rif. Their covetousness thus awakened, they evidently insured temporarily against feud renewal, but they also stipulated that it would revive the embers of their hatred.

671 613 628 182 [183] These agreements or inter-lineage truces obeyed a double mechanism originating from the vicious circle in which they were debated. On the one hand they originated a series of regulatory norms of coexistence which, gaining in amplitude of concept and extending their jurisdiction to the generalizing of their advantages and the persistence of their exemplarity, painfully came to gain the adhesion of other nearby and related lineages until they were adopted by larger social and territorial units, including districts or entire tribes; and this situation gave rise to some of those qanums upon which we will comment further on. On the other hand, they represented the ultimate [728] step to which anarchy led, responding to those most curious periods of [195] their history in which one powerful group, having recourse to violence, broke the truce in defense of its own interests, the official recognition of this fact being given by the imgharen in the suq in the face of general consternation, with the tragic phrase War dha bu r-haqq.[12]

628 602 182 195 "Now there is no law"[13]: such was the official form of declaring the state of anarchy into which the Rifians so frequently fell, a phrase which obliged them to strengthen their kin group, without dismay and by all means in their power; for a man's kinsmen were his last refuge in case of social accident.

195 181 628 "Now there is no law" was repeated in the humble dwellings perched upon the heights; and soon the Rifian mountains regained their harsh, untranquil and agitated life, the bloody phantasmagoria of vengeance spreading again over the slopes through the cries of victims and the echo of gunshots.

628 613 619 134 But the instinct of self-preservation again prevailed, first with pacts like the above, allying small lineages, and afterwards with pacts which, as will be shown later, forced whole tribes into more or less long pauses, during which they took a breathing spell in their rude and savage struggle for existence, which was complicated to an extraordinary degree by a poor and ungrateful soil.

443 182 The reader will appreciate the importance which the market has in Rifian society, for it is not just a simple place of weekly commerce.....

443 671 182 [648] The market in Rifian society is the preferential institution, the role of which, in my opinion, has today (1939) been partly absorbed by the Office of Native Affairs[14] and by the mahkamas or tribunals where the law can be laughed at much more easily than it can be in the market, under a carob tree in full view of all, the market to which the Rifians are so addicted and about which the qudat (pl. of qadi) are so refractory, the market which is today free of all control, including that of its constituents, the most efficacious control of all.[15]

443 671 That the market, among Rifians, was the temple of law, of Parliament....is proven by the fact that in all markets laws were made through pacts, referenda and proclamations; and these unfortunately lack sanction through official publication. In it public affairs of general

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property in that belonging to him, in conformance with traditional law.[25]

695 Those who attended the present (act) brought their testimony to the above according to the requirements of the interested parties.

805 --In the middle of Jumad al-Awwal of the year 1336 (February 27, 1918). --The 'adl, Muhammad bin Muhammad bin al-Hajj al-Warnuri.--Another, whose name is not known.--Another, Muhammad bin Sidi 'Abd al-Qadir al-Ghamri.

B) Commentary:

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The social disintegration which Rifian society has reached is proven by these individual agreements between dharfiqin (Blanco: note 1, corresponding to text of qanun). In the face of helplessness or irregular functioning of higher-level associations, the poor tribesmen, before falling into complete anarchy, hastened to conclude an agreement with a neighboring group in order to attenuate that anarchy, succeeding in the hard struggle for life on a poor soil. These agreements thus formed true islets of irregular and variable peace, anchored in functional (sic) anarchy.

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The necessity of agreements between lower-level lineages, who were abandoned by the rudimentary organization, obeyed, according to my understanding, those most curious periods which followed the public declaration of anarchy in the suq, when one powerful group managed by force to sustain the punishment, breaking the truce.

614 As the dispute was generalized between two preponderant rivals, the unaffected groups, before falling into anarchy, and with that notable instinct of self-defense, worked to bring about these agreements,

628 a guarantee of peace which, little by little, by virtue of their
613 acceptance by new and neighboring dharfiqin, came to be converted into
728 a general agreement between clans, thus increasing the radius of
614 peace; or they even inspired them to adhere once more to an interrupted truce.

628 "There is no law", the imgharen announced through the mouth of
616 the market crier, and the poor tribesmen, loading their faithful and
[195] inseparable companions, their rifles, were pressured into forming the
[203] ranks of a liff, and into working out guarantees or neighboring alliances, such as that which we shall examine, which, for greater efficacy, publicity and solemnity, they proclaimed in front of their notables in the suq (parliament--sic), rendering them necessary and valid for fulfillment (Blanco: note 2, in text).

671 These agreements had no other legal connotation than the very
628 short one of holding off the next spark of vengeance, being disrupted
728 or broken, due to the good will of trying to serve (Blanco: note 14) for repression and as an example of punishment, their efficacy being that of lengthening the brief periods of peace.

829 This is a rational mechanism. Everybody understood that war
721 would exterminate him; everybody desired to be at peace. But in their
[182] independent-minded democracy, they did not hit the mark with an organ of enforcement capable of imposing it, if anyone tried to disturb it.

671 Tired of tragic bloodfeuding, they drew up a truce and, logi-
628 cally, nominated the most powerful (man) to guarantee it and watch
728 over it.

621 which make up the said jma'th; they are at the same time the most
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554 influential and respected members of the community. Without any
[182] presidency, without rigid formalities, without oceans of ink or ridiculous voting techniques, this democracy of lineages, galled by necessity and convenience, knows how to unite the established social norms which have to regulate, in what follows, the relations between the different lineages.

671 It is thus a people's law, made by representatives of the
621 community, surrounding the act in which it is originated with all
181 the guarantee and formality for the satisfaction of the always suspicious mass and for the possible waylaying (in ambush) of its repre-
792 sentatives. For this, and as a guarantee, a greater solemnity and
621 public knowledge, two holy men are invited to and attend the meeting;
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554 they will keep the session from degenerating into a dispute because of the prestige which they enjoy, for the conclusion of the agreement, under which they place themselves, assures their guard and divine benediction. Even the most exigent will remain satisfied, closing the
792 road to backbiting. Even more, in order to avoid forgetfulness or
621 capricious modifications in matters of such transcendence, they draw
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212 it up in writing; it is easy to understand the genesis of the agreement
671 and the development of the session in which it is taken. From that
527 time to this, it is public feasting, a subject for all the commentaries
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571 in the village (households, watering places for women, and mosques), such as the numerous thefts in and damages to the orchards, the harvests of which are ready and which they fear will be wasted; these are events which are repeated every year at the same time and for which they are obliged to assemble in order to keep them down.

623 Thus public
182 esteem and the ideas which such deeds provoke in others are regained;
673 they satisfy the mass of the people without having to resort to cru-
687 elty, for.....in a truly humane feeling, note c in the text shows that
695 the author of the crime must have been caught in flagrante delicto.
627 Discounting possible vengeance and not very sure of having succeeded in
623 doing so, note e in the text shows the institution of a popular tri-
554 bunal formed by two neutral individuals, two men who neither take part
671 in the agreement nor are members of the jma'th, but the fact that they have prestige in it is a maximum guarantee of the workability of the qanun in question.

623 Furthermore, the jma'th as a social unit is personified not in
621 its mqaddim, in the Arab manner, but, hostile to personal power, in a triumvirate formed by three of the legislators who took part in the meeting and who remain obligated to watch over the fulfillment of the agreement. This executive organ of power is made up of laymen, and it as much as the aforementioned tribunal is the result of popular election.

671 In the few lines which this qanun has, aside from creating a
624 a code, a tribunal and a police force, all of which are, naturally,
182 gratuitous, it creates a rural exchequer, and all this with a good, natural and admirable feeling.

182 It restricts, through fear of fines, damages to the small social
671 unit it represents by guaranteeing the safety of property and discard-
626 ing cravings for economic expansion at the expense of member lineages.[35]
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691 It creates lineage authorities whose jobs are gratuitous, and,
613 always suspicious, it avoids concentration of power in the hands of one
661 person, a fact which permits neither a shade of tyranny by the latter
182 nor a bastardization of his office.

000 671 182 628 681 nor a bastardization of his office. It creates guarantees for the accused, protecting him from bloodfeuds; it indemnifies the social unit, the subclan of Imhauren, from injuries caused by some of its members, so that when the fine is donated to the habus of the village mosque, through the particular conceptualization and application of these funds in the Rif, a part of the money always came back to the jma'th in kind; and the eagerness for a reward, as among participating European functionaries, who multiply the fines by increasing their investigations and denunciations in proportion to their needs, was discarded.

671 It has--and why not?--among its other defects one which is certainly a simple defect in editing, although the frequency with which 681 it is repeated makes this doubtful in several cases. The intention (author's italics) (Blanco: note f, in text) is punished, but how can 627 it be proven? According only to the prudent arbitration of the popular tribunal formed by the two aforementioned individuals. A bad business.

671 621 623 614 182 Curious and noteworthy is the palpable demonstration of this municipal letter, of this qanun of a jma'th, which is careful not to overstep the bounds of adjacent institutions, such as those of personal status law (inheritance, etc.) or of those handled by the immediately superior social unit, the clan, with its qanun approved and drawn up in the markets (murders and woundings, etc.), a fact which reveals the interrelationship and interdependence of the different social units, and even their institutions and how they function.

671 627 182 This qanun is limited, logically, to neighborhood questions, among which there figures in first place that of public security (espionage)[36] and secondly that of property.

000 (espionage)[36] and secondly that of property. It A A says nothing regarding
671 the question of irrigation, because within the territory of this subclan
312 there is not a single point of communal water available or usable only
614 by this jma'th, as happens in Thamasind (see Qanun of Tamasint); on the other hand, it forms part of a group of irrigating jma'ths subjected to the same norms which are described in detail in Chapter XIV, and, if it does not touch other points of coexistence and if it is observed in other qanuns, this is simply because such questions did not give rise to any disagreements, for all members of the subclan accepted the old and very well-known customs of their jma'th in good spirit.

000 And rough, practical men cannot lose time inventing or making things up, even though they may be capable of doing so.

671 This qanun, like almost all others, brings into relief the sweat, efforts and oversights of those who drew it up, in order to validate the precepts agreed upon and in order to satisfy, for those attending to them[37]; for, attentive to his individual interests, a man would wish to make an addendum if a mishap had occurred in his orchard
[623] the previous night, as in note i in the text. Amplifications or corrections were required, for, fearing that they were not understood by the hard-headed councilmembers, the plaintiff was accredited before the legislative assembly as proof of his presence at the legislative meeting even if only to legislate egotistically for his orchard.

623 With this, they accredited that under a severe and formalized
182 appearance, there was no more than childishness (sic) and incapacity to govern (sic): lost in small details, strongly addicted to minutiae, passionately influenced by the latest incident, working anarchically (sic), each person obsessed with his own problems, attentive to his

A A [i.e., the qanun--Analyst] -296-

623 own circumstantial interest, their councils and the agreements fallen
182 back upon in them lacked that breadth and generality which would have been needed for a longer duration in any jural operation. In a short time, new, unspecified cases or prejudice among the influential men brought their usefulness to an end and necessitated their being redrafted, in which previous experience, the analysis of which was discarded in order to resolve the question of the moment, did not play a part.

671 For this reason written laws in the Rif are rare, of only
212 relative value and minimal jural operation, which did not go beyond the time it took the minors (author's italics), the small ones, to forget the announcement of the majors (author's italics) by the criers in the markets to reach their hands.

671 They do not have the severity of European law which, even though drafted in moments of emotion, gathers up and encloses in itself principles of general usefulness, a usefulness which does not necessarily exist at the time of codification but which comes into play with possible and presumable variations which later times can introduce, by which, with the prolongation of their legal operation, their disclosure and exemplarity increase, resulting in the slow but sure advance of society.

5. QANUN OF THE JAMA'A OF TAMASINT (AITH WARYAGHAR):

671 A) Qanun:
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621 (Blanco: paragraph a) Praise be to God.--Copy.--In front of
623 both witnesses testifying at the present act, those of the jama'a of Tamasint as-Sifli, Lower Thamasind, appeared for judgment, including:

623 the imposition of minimal social obligations (education and hospitality), the equal division of duties and work, and, finally, nomination of a man to represent the jma'th and to see that local law is enforced.

This jma'th and its representative were legitimate organs of the people, an authentic and faithful reflection of the feeling and convenience of its members, live and efficient organisms. Today a 623 177 182 rigid Arab framework and its imposed and despotic representatives has submerged the jma'th, without any alternative other than the hatred or scorn of its members, according to whether the chief is a tyrant, or a slave to his needs or whims.

436 681 For an analysis of the proportioning of the punishment, it is well to know the equivalents of the Rifian monetary system, as follows:[41]

Mithqal--2 Spanish pesetas

Bsita--0.60 Spanish pesetas

Rbi'a--0.50 Spanish pesetas

Uqiyya or Spanish onza, "ounce"--0.20 Spanish pesetas

Ujjhain (two muzunas)--0.10 Spanish pesetas,

Muzuna or Spanish blanquillo, "little target"--0.05 Spanish pesetas.

681 673 With these data to hand, we may now establish the framework of fines which occur in the qanun commented upon, in the following order:

Theft by day, of cereals or fruits (figs, etc.)--100 pesetas

Theft by night, in the orchards or gardens--20 pesetas

Threats with firearms--20 pesetas

Thefts by day, in the orchards--10 pesetas

Threats with knives or daggers--5 pesetas

Damages to dams--5 pesetas

671 It eschews pardon,
614 it demands proof and it shows the reality of the
62] social unit, the "fraction" (author's italics--the translator
619 would call it "clan", with translator's italics), the characteristic
631 and fundamental unit of Rifian social organization, in the same way that the jma'th (author's italics) is the elementary unit, the tribe (author's italics) the principal unit and the confederation (author's italics) the superior unit.[49]

443 The life of all peoples demands some commercial interchange and, by the same token, commercial relations as such; and the result of this is that these relations must be regulated. This necessity
621 impels the jma'ths resident in a small area to satisfy it by estab-
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443 lishing a common market in a fixed and determined place on a fixed and
671 determined day of the week, and guaranteeing access and permanence to those who attend it by means of an agreement among its representatives, whose written accord, respected across time, forms the law of the clan, an example of which is the qanun commented upon here. A law which, in
• [182] principle, has as its only objective the guarantee of commercial interchange, establishing a truce to its disastrous life, it becomes accustomed little by little to social coexistence, giving consistency to the immediately superior unit, the jma'th, the demarcation of which at least corresponds topographically to an accident of the terrain (the side of a mountain, the course of a river, a meseta, etc.) abridging its pride and feeling of solidarity in seeing its market thus favored, converting it into an oasis of peace, a localistic tie which, overflowing the reduced limits of the jma'th, widens its notions of humanitarianism.

671 Look at how this admirable qanun shows in its first paragraph
443 the market as the temple where the agreement, the law of the people,
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671 443 614 776 was drawn up, as the names of those who inspired it disappear into a convenient anonymity as the generic "those of the clan", under the otherworldly tutelage of Sidi 'Amran. As for being alive and present, 671 614 776 I consider that the jealous and rivalrous constituents of this saint would neither have consented, however great his sanctity might be, to figure expressly in this qanun; for such was the independent or anarchical spirit of this clan, that, having iziddifen or imgharen like all other clans, nobody wanted to see himself deferred or ordered around, 554 even in name only. There is no master nor, by the same token, are there servants, titles or honors. Only men and rifles, and only reality and harshness.

614 671 Nevertheless, the common good succeeds in putting the clan's ideas into effect (author's italics--i.e. "the common good makes them agree"), according to the expression of the first paragraph of the qanun, which reveals to us the amount of discussion and work that this would cost.

671 Rifian law grows, pacifying the minds of those who live by it, staisfying a need, not an ideal; and doing so as naturally as the waters of 'Ain Tihalalin, beside which it was made, slake the thirst of the wayfarer and even the clarity of both: the wayfarer and the law. For the function of the water and the function of the Rifian [182] legal system was analogous: to cure, even though the cure was not always successful.

671 443 Rifian society, as this qanun proves, establishes a place of peace, a place which is not (translator's italics) the temple of God, the place of prayer and that selected by almost all other peoples, but the market and its environs, the temple of the merchants. This proves

671 This proves
182 that Rifian law tended to satisfy a need and not an ideal, as we have
443 just said; for further on, the qanun of the Aith 'Abdallah points out
796 a truce to be held on a given day, on Tuesday, the market day, and not on Friday, the religious day and the day of attendance at the noon prayer in the mosque. The day of peace is thus a layman's day.....

671 The law is simple. And hard. And sufficient to be encrusted with obligatory relief in the most refractory cranium of a believer, an objective impossible to obtain among modern societies. Nobody pretended ignorance, as all are wont to do or swear today.

There are neither aggravators nor attenuators, only consummate (and consummated) acts.

Paragraph a: They discount intentions, so difficult to prove
[681] and needing so much patience to investigate. They attain results more easy to prove and more quick to sanction (i.e. castigate) and be sanctioned, in conformance with their rudimentary law.

671 Paragraph b: A hard punishment; the liquidation of the mur-
682 derer, with the loophole that after his flight, the law may fatten on him. But it does not give a heavy punishment to his agnates, although it avoids impunity. It does not cease to be more humanitarian than other analogous qanuns, if indeed this custom is followed in reality.
[681] The gradation of fines is simple and even attempted murder is penalized.

671 Paragraph c: A typical example of the fact that Rifian law is only concerned with the external manifestation of the crime.

[681] Paragraph d: And so that the gradation of the punishment follows that manifestation as a shadow does a body, from the time that it is initiated.

671 794 212 In these childish (sic) legislators we may observe the suspicions and fears which the poor tulba plant with their confused drafts of these qanuns, drafts which they never succeed in becoming satisfied about; for they see themselves bound to the impossibility of correcting their vague and hazy language and can only modify it with addenda which for the most part only give rise to new and further confusions. But this is not the fault of the man who grasps his rifle, but rather of him who wields the pen.

671 [62] [623] [614] We see in this clan qanun how it refuses to concern itself with matters that fall within the exclusive competence of the jma'th, which has its own independent life[50], as the final step of Berber anarchy (sic). Thus, for example, it says nothing about irrigation, orchards or fields, hospitality, education, grazing lands, collecting and gathering, etc., and neither does it enter into private rights, personal and successoral law. It limits itself, rather, to regulating the coexistence of its component jma'ths, lineages and individuals in the only places where they come together (i.e. markets).

671 183 It is also to be seen that the social or public law which this qanun represents is inspired by norms which are more elevated through the non-admission of compensation, such as blood-spilling, in cases of common prestige (murder in the market) without, at the same time, ceasing to be inspired by norms more humanitarian than the private rights admitted by vengeance and reprisal, to which the codes of social units like this one are opposed,.....

671 614 613 182 So that, while the qanuns of clans tend toward the clans' preservation, they develop solidarity, and neutralize the rivalries of

component lineage groups, for the practices of such groups tend to disintegrate them through the violent opposition of the individual interests of their members. The clan officiates as a soothing influence on the disorderly appetites of the lineages, patrilineally and patrilaterally united by the strong tie of blood.[51]

7. QANUN OF THE AITH 'ADHIYA[52] (AITH WARYAGHAR)

A) Qanun:

Copy.--Praise be to God. In the presence of both the undersigned notaries, all those of Bani 'Adhiya (properly, Bani 'Aziya) made testimony, both adults and minors (author's italics) who constitute the jama'as of the Ait Tazurakht, Ait ar-Rabda, Ait Kharbush, Ait Mnudh, Ait Ajdir, Ait (illegible)[53], Ait Ighmiren and Ait Fars, that they, when they went together to the tomb of the saint Sidi al-Hajj 'Umar, in ar-Rabda, sacrificed two bulls as an offering to him[54], (on the occasion of which) an act of reconciliation took place between them, with respect to murder, theft, pillage and other acts of this kind. In case any of them should kill another, then all the above-mentioned villages of the Bani 'Adhiya shall unite against him and burn his estate and that of his brothers (i.e. agnates); they shall drag them from their houses and exact from them a fine of 1000 duros. This (shall be the case) if he should have killed outside the market[55] or without witnesses (literally, "without a meeting"). In case he should kill someone in the market or in front of witnesses, then the procedure shall be as stated above, all uniting against him, burning his estate and that of his brothers (i.e. agnates), and taking from them, as a punishment against him, a fine of 2000 duros.[56]

law, a lay law ignorant of religion even though it speaks of the Sacred Book, the irregular application of which, in such a recent and turbulent period, leaps into view, proving that Rifian Islamization is superficial.[57]

This pact combines all the pleasant conditions of the Rifian appetite. It is verified in the habitual place of reunion for transcendental acts, taking place under sacred protection, in addition to lubricating the agreement with the heathen rite of blood sacrifice, the Islamic promise of peace, and the feast day for the sober Rifian, an enforced vegetarian.[58]

It brings together the mass of the Aith 'Adhiya, a subclan of the khums (Rifian thakhammasth) of Aith Bu 'Ayyash; and democratic practice advises this mass not to mention the name of any individual in writing, as this might presuppose questions of distinction and preference, swelling their heads.

It establishes the ddiyith[59], fixing it at 2000 duros, the maximum sanction which it is worth pointing out and imprinting indelibly in the minds of those who attend. This is a fabulous amount of money for the economic means of the people to whom it relates; and it is accepted as much out of the respect which radiates from it as from being generally admitted in analogous pacts of which they have news in neighboring districts.

It must be pointed out, in order to avoid the confusions which can arise from the different editorship of the qanuns, that the real ddiyith, or blood money (author's italics), does not, in reality, differ anywhere throughout the Rifian mountains, and must be valued at

5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

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613 While relationships with one's own and neighboring lineages, regulated by tradition, were maintained, the liff did not plead permanence as a hope of reward, but whenever injustice or violence, ripping up their pact or norm of coexistence, left an individual or his lineage-mates helpless, these latter attained in the liff a final support for their rights and in all cases a secure material refuge for their persons and possessions.

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999 The liff must not be compared to European political parties (author's italics), for these are activated under a religious aegis or under a governmental form, both things being ones which did not enter into the preoccupations of the Rifians, for whom republics and Islam were points which did not admit controversy even in the slightest degree. Destined to a rude struggle for existence in a harsh and miserable environment, the speculations of the spirit had neither place nor occasion to make themselves felt in the fact of the other, primordial and undeferable.

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182 To any presumed victims the liff was the best guarantee and forewarning, as through it individuals and social units were forced to bring about the alliances (author's italics) which they deemed necessary in order to oppose adverse forces; and thus they insured their own existence.

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613 The mechanism of the liff worked the miracle, in the anarchical (sic) state of Rifian society, of permitting the coexistence of the
619 family or kin group or social unit (i.e. the lineage, on whatever level),
182 as small as it might be, among others more numerous in point of population with no diminution of its integrity; and this fact permitted the

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613 survival, up into our own time, of insignificant tribes, true Rifian
619 Switzerlands, authentic islets, like Thafarsith, which were sur-
182 rounded by powerful neighbors.

616 Thanks to such a mechanism, the individual within the family,
182 the family within the jma'th, the jma'th within the clan, the clan within the tribe, and the tribe within the area or region all attained an unstable equilibrium, but an equilibrium, nevertheless, from start to finish, the most curious facet of which was expressed in the linkage of clans and in the two great rival bands of the Ghmara and the Sinhaja.

616 I am unable to determine whether the liff was the cause or
121 the result of the fractionization which Rifian anarchy brought about, populating the mountains with a real mosaic of small autonomous states which were grouped into two rival bands and equilibrated thanks to the linkage of the liff system.[102] Many reasons could be given for one or the other theory.

616 It is certain that the liff, in the Rifian ethos, is a mysterious and powerful force, to which the tribesmen submitted body and soul, if one might say so without necessarily admitting a comparison of European methods of alliance.[103]

671 This qanun offers further proof in support of the fact that the
614 clan in the Rifian mountains was an autonomous state within the tribe.
619 Thus, as in this case, we see it brought together with the neighboring
644 clans of another tribe (Bni Gmil), regarding the subject of war on the
648 border, while its members either forget or eschew union with another clan of their own tribe (Swahil of Bni Bu Frah)[104]; according to European modes of thought, such an action would induce a lack of esteem

312 of the beds, the Rifians were unable to think in terms of large irrigation developments to lead the ditch to some small and dried-up meseta; for the minimal amount of these in the interior of the country and the longitude of the ditch which they would have needed did not compensate for the effort and expense they would have had nor the loa[illegible] they would have incurred (i.e. from neighboring segments of the tribes) in order to maintain the ditch as such. Nature has in no [182] way favored the Rifians, who must gain everything they own through their own efforts. The men, the new men, the protectors (i.e. the 648 312 Spanish administration) can and must do something to help them, and thus they wait for it and trust them, although up to the present time (1935), and in this connection, nothing other than prejudices and injuries have occurred, as happens with the turn of water which they have been made to cede to the Granja Agricola (i.e. model farm) of Imzuren and to a half-dozen Europeans, who, placing their minute holdings in dry rather than irrigable lands, have by virtue of more modern methods converted them into irrigated terrain; and these appear today like minute green islets among the calcinated holdings of the natives, whose ill-will and adverse commentaries are just, logical and in no way flattering.[122] "Nubth nj-Makhzin", the "turn of the Government", as they say, which means that in order to sustain it a group of mkhaznis is necessary; and the salaries of these men added to those of the directors and work force are certainly far higher than the four bushels of vegetables which they manage to obtain and the unknown profits of other kinds which they do their best to make.

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2nd Day (24 hours): Dhifirasin: Aith Mhand u Yihya
Im'aruwen[136]

3rd Day (24 hours): r-Hujjaj: Aith r-'Arbi
Dharwa nd-Hajj Si 'Ari Ubarru
I'arhuthen[137]

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We thus have, in the regimen of the ditch with which we are dealing, an excellent example of Rifian solidarity, observable in the turn of the Imhauren, as in times of dryness or drought, when they need more themselves, they hasten to aid their neighbors of Aith Bu Dhimmus (who are ordinarily limited to their own turn of hours of irrigation in another ditch, that of Thafadhna, as we shall see later), although by this the other three lineage branches or ijujga only harm themselves, because they defer one of their own turns by nine more days, and even if the turn is a small one in itself, they only receive it once every nine days.

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For a better understanding of the mechanics of irrigation among Rifians, we shall study in greater detail the order which is followed in this ditch[138], for it is curious to observe how they have simplified it, in spite of the modifications which are introduced in the case of the Aith Bu Dhimmus, for example, with its intermittent (author's italics) rights, so as not to interrupt the turn in general; but, at the same time, how can we explain the miracle of how the thousands of Rifian irrigators and the labyrinth of ditches which traverse the Plain of al-Husaima do not produce any disturbances nor give rise to any incidents other than those occasioned by ignorance on the part of the Europeans, of which the Rifians of importance sometimes try to take advantage or the avarice of the fortunately few and ill-named "colons"?

312 20th Day: Aith Mhand u Yihya (Dhifirasin)
571 21st Day: Aith r-'Arbi (r-Hujjaj)
613 22nd Day: Aith 'Abdallah u Hmid (Imhauren)--recuperates its turn

23rd Day: Im'aruwen (Dhifirasin)

24th Day: Dharwa nd-Hajj Si 'Ari Ubarru

25th Day: Aith Bu Dhimmus (Imhauren)--takes turn of Aith Muhand u Hmid

26th Day: Aith Mhand u Yihya (Dhifirasin)

27th Day: I'arhuthen (read I'abbuthen) (r-Hujjaj)

28th Day: Aith 'Aru Hmid (Imhauren)

29th Day: Aith Mhand u Yihya (Dhifirasin)

30th Day: Aith r-'Arbi (r-Hujjaj)

And so on.[140] To attempt to vary this unending chain which the [182] irrigation turns of the Rifians make up in those ditches with permanent flow is to promote major altercations and to upset the equilibrium of the whole of the Plain of al-Husaima.

312 The simple attempt by a Rifian miller to divert for a few
571 seconds the water of Bufma'iz so that it would flow to his turbine mill,
402 I recall, provided the motive for a sudden and vehement protest by the
578 users of this ditch, en masse, to the authorities; the whole Plain of al-Husaima took alarm to such an extent that no procedure nor influence (on the part of the authorities) could be brought to bear toward the peaceful possibility that the people might acknowledge the man's alleged right; and, nevertheless, this Plain needs more than a concerted arrangement and ordination, an improvement and rectification of the principal ditches;[141] and above all it needs a possible increase of flow for the outlet of subterranean or subalveal waters.

21. THE QANUNS OF HUNTING (RAYAH):[179]

224 619 The data which follow have been gathered principally among hunters from the tribes of the Ibuqquyen, Aith Hadhifa (Aith Waryaghar), Zarqat, Targist, Aith 'Ammarth and Aith (or Bni) Mazduki; and they can be considered as general hunting qanuns for the region.

A) Significance:

224 182 Hunting in the Rif was neither a sport nor a profession in the European manner. It was a physiological necessity, and it is still 134 considered so today. A poor soil, accidented and dry, rendered it 312 difficult for the tribesmen to utilize its scarce sources of water; 262 and the consumption of meat was limited, because of the scarcity of animals (i.e. both domestic and wild) to Fridays, feast days, days on which pacts were concluded, days of illness, etc., and to market 262 days. As the Rifian is by necessity a vegetarian[180], sacrifices of 782 animals acquire the status of a rite, and they form a fundamental ceremony in the most transcendental and important acts of his life. Peace and war, pacts, births and deaths, rogations, etc., have to be 224 sealed with meat for greater solemnity and efficacy. In hunting, 782 therefore, Rifian society finds a physiological compensation in no 182 way negligible to its sober life and ancestral appetite for meat, the sacrifice in common and equitable distribution of which is subject to strict rules[181], the object of the most rigorous tradition and fiscalization in order not to squander the slender reserves, which are 000 appraised in a manner unsuspected by European minds. The European visitor who is entertained in a Rifian household is not in a position to appreciate sufficiently the hospitality which is offered to him,

231 There are practically no communal events,
796 and few pertaining to individual life crises, which can be accom-
782 plished without the sacrifice of an animal. Perhaps this social
231 and ceremonial significance of animals among a sedentary, horti-
182 cultural people can be explained by the fact that they live by a
[771] religion whose manifest forms of spiritual observation developed among pastoral transhumants. I do not mean to imply that goats and sheep are as important in the lives of the Berbers as are camels to the Bedouin or cattle to the Nuer. The economic base of the Riffian is perhaps too diversified for such psychological domination to take place. Nor were there the same sort of feuds between goat herdsmen as exist with camel or cattle. If, however, we regard livestock as merely secondary food sources in the economic sphere, we shall miss its importance to the social life and institutional structure of the Rif and hence misevaluate its true economic significance.

121 In the discourse which follows I shall be dealing with economic units of extremely small scale. To a reader oriented to the scale of economic transaction which takes place in post-industrial society, the examples used may seem irrelevant to an examination of economic organization. My problem, nonetheless,
433 impels me to use such examples. Waterson (1962:4) estimates that
435 the annual per capita output of the fellah in traditional
[191] Moroccan agriculture is 30,000 francs or $60. In the Rif, which is regarded as one of the poorest sections of Morocco,
231 the figure is probably lower. Yet my data on the average prices
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585 571 431 182 Gift exchanges of this sort, however, are part of an ongoing system, rooted in past transactions and perpetuating future obligations. If, for example, a man paid $300 for a wedding and received back $300 in gifts, the account would by no means be balanced. Unless the man were wealthy, the original $300 was accumulated through a network of previous obligations and the subsequent $300 has set up a whole new series of obligations. [426] There are few Riffians who are owed no debts and owe no debts to others. The system is rarely in even balance where one's debts are equal to one's credits. It is a system of exchange guided entirely by its own rules and completely divorced from commercial exchange. Its ability to work as a system is guaranteed by the pride and honor of the participants.

585 574 The final ceremonial act involves a feast held on the seventh day following the last day of the wedding. On this day the immediate relatives (father and mother) of the bride see her for the first time since she left their home. This is a much smaller ceremony, involving only the close relatives of [431] the two families involved. On this occasion, in addition to the food provided by the host, small gifts are given the bride by her own family. This celebration is socially important because the groom's family wishes to impress upon the visitors 585 574 152 how well their daughter has married. This sentiment seems to be particularly felt among the women associated with the groom's family. They are placed in a strained position since the bride's [292] party are dressed in their finest guest costume, while the women [291] of the groom's family wear their everyday working clothes.

423 Property going to females, either to widows or daughters,
428 tends not to be disruptive since their control over their inher-
562 itance is minimized by law and social custom. Because of the
[587] practice of levirate, traditionally the widow's property was merely transferred from the effective management of one brother to that of another. Whether or not the widow marries a brother of her deceased husband, she can in no case sell her property without the permission of her husband's family.

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428 The case of daughter inheritance is somewhat more dis-
[768] ruptive. While widows generally remain within their deceased husband's family for the protection this affords, daughters marry out. Thus the daughter as another man's wife has a male champion to press claims for use or sale of the inheritance. To the question of should a man come to farm the land of his wife or demand a portion of its production, my informants state that technically he could do so but that no man would want to do this and that to their knowledge no man has ever done so.

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431 The prevailing mechanism for avoiding disputes over the
578 inheritance of a daughter is a gift exchange between a man and
182 his sister's husband. If, for example, A's sister has married B,
607 B holds certain theoretical rights over his wife's land. A, on
562 the other hand, generally cultivates the land. B does not exercise his claim, and indeed the community would disapprove if he did so. However, it is also considered appropriate for A when he visits his sister, to give B's household certain goods, processed barley, fruit, or whatever, which compensate for B's

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428 noninterference in the use of the land inherited by A's sister
431 and B's wife. Another mechanism which achieves reciprocal
578 equality over inheritance is in sister exchange whereby land
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607 claims are mutually balanced off.

428 Despite the weak claim that daughters exercise over their
423 inheritance, there are certain legal restrictions over their
607 property. A brother cannot sell his sister's land nor construct
562 on it unless he has obtained the prior permission of his sister's husband. Likewise, a husband cannot sell his wife's inherited property unless he has consulted with the woman's brothers, who have first option to purchase the land.

423 The male Riffian has a more solid claim over his inheri-
428 tance and although some families continue to work the land of their father jointly under the administration of the oldest brother, there tends to be a fragmentation of land with each successive generation. This process tends to level out differ-
423 entiations based on property holdings. On the other hand there
183 is no special cultural value placed on "shared poverty." The
556 aggrandizement of property holding is not a goal towards which
425 the community voices disapproval. To buy land increases a man's wealth as well as his prestige, but he is regarded as advancing his children rather than engaging in entrepreneurship or capital development. He is also regarded as maintaining community solidarity, which is quite the opposite of what the entrepreneur does. To alienate land is regarded as a great source of shame in the Rif. The property which one's father passed on should be

675 commercial transactions in an industrial society, legal surety in the Rif tends to be based on prestige, reputation, and status. Rights, privileges, duties, immunities, and liabilities are mostly non-contractual (excluding land titles and marriage documents). 675 Thus working associations between the wealthier and poorer men 466 of the community, whereby a laborer who provides all the work on 464 another man's piece of property and receives one-fifth of the crop, are always verbal agreements. Likewise, agreements over such a critical area as water rights, including the rotation of rights of irrigation, are exclusively verbal. Partnerships, pledges, leases, warranties and so forth are rarely 'paperized' but based, rather, on verbal agreement.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how the 556 social and cultural configuration of Berber existence affects 554 the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Among the Riffians 182 wealth as an abstract has little meaning. Wealth gains signifi- 183 cance when it is an attribute of prestige (although prestige does [128] not depend entirely on wealth). Prestige is gained from living by the code of the community and fulfilling one's obligations to the community. Those who fulfill such obligations have political prestige both in the realm of the Berber community and outside it. A direct consequence of this is that profit as a system of motivation has little operative or analytic value in determining what happens to material goods. Resources are not 'free'; they cannot be allocated in a social vacuum to obtain maximum financial rewards. On the contrary, resources are socially 'bound' by

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the fact that the society disapproves of any action which disrupts the solidarity of the community.

443 182 571 los indígenas, por si mismos, van señalando, con su ausencia e inhibición, cuáles son los que deben desaparecer" (1930:122). Or as Mikesell argues, improved communications and the bus favor the growth of large regional markets over the local one. "The simple charms of the local suq lose their appeal when larger markets with a wider range of goods are accessible" (Mikesell 1958:509).

443 182 114 Aside from the fact that market appeal is not based on "simple charms," I think both Albéniz and Mikesell have founded their conclusions on a false evaluation of the purposes of the market. When an institution serves multiple purposes it cannot easily be replaced by another institution which serves a single purpose. The large, impersonal regional market does not fulfill the social function of the local suq. Even as a source for supplying the fellah, the regional market has only a marginal value since most purchases are of articles (kerosene, tea, tobacco, etc.) whose value does not appreciably alter from market to market. Indeed, Mikesell elsewhere recognizes that from a buying standpoint one market is as good as another. "Everyone has a turn with the itinerant peddlers, but few purchase anything; for in this area of subsistence economy each family guards its currency for a marriage or some other special event" (1958:503).

443 182 571 But it is especially the social functions of the market which reinforce the fellah's loyality to his local suq. It is here that he can maximize his advantages of being part of a status economy. Here he can seek out local notables to assist him.

He can get credit in the local shops on the basis of his reputation. Here he can consult relatives and friends, settle petty disputes, arrange marriages and sell property. His ties to the marketplace do not depend on "improved communication" but on a whole series of both economic and noneconomic involvements with the local market.

What is the nature then of this local market? I shall try to arrive at a picture of the common elements of all sugs of the Rif, although there will be slightly different elements or emphasis in each specific sug. As Bourrilly comments, "L'importance de ces souks varie naturallement avec l'importance des régions qu'ils desservent, de la clientèle qu'ils attirent, des zones de production dont ils sont le débouché" (1932:211). Still, after spending many weary days in such places one cannot help but sympathize with Albéniz: "Visto y descrito uno cualquiera de ellos, están vistos y descritos los demás" (1930:118).

Most of the markets are walled-in enclosures with only one or two openings, assuring the collection of market taxes. They are ideally located near a source of water so that animals can drink. Special places outside the walls are allocated for the quartering of mules and donkeys. Inside the market are rows of permanent structures, either small shops or cafes. On a non-market day the site will be deserted except for a few soldiers assigned to each market and a few tribesmen, sitting inside the canteens drinking tea.

443 pertinent features of the marketplace and its importance in the economy of the Rif.

443 182 571 The market in the Rif does not function simply to facilitate exchange but serves a whole series of social needs of the fellah. By looking at the noneconomic functions of the market we can better understand why a man will ride a mule or walk for two hours to market, yet make only a single purchase. We will understand why a seller would prefer to deal in a familiar market although other markets may have higher prevailing prices for his goods. The market has both an economic and a social function and it is difficult to say which has primacy over the other. As Montagne points out, "Le montagnard ne se rend pas au 'souq' uniquement pour acheter ou vendre, il y vient souvent aussi pour rencontrer ses amis, régler des contestations de terrain ou de pâturage, ou plus simplement encore pour connaître les nouvelles du jour" (1930:249). And Bourrilly has noted the importance "non seulement économique mais encore politique, de ces souks ruraux. Ces rendez-vous périodiques, que des liens d'hospitalité, tels que la zettata [a promise of safe passage], rendent plus forts, aboutissent forcément à une fusion plus ou moins complète des groupes qui fréquentent les marchés voisins" (1932:216).

Only by observing the noneconomic significance can we avoid the type of thinking that led Albéniz to conclude that ". . . poco a poco van disminuyendo el número de zocos en el territorio, como consecuencia de la bondad de las vías de comunicación. Los zocos de escasa vida se ven absorbidos por los de auge más intenso, y

443 434 is too low for the large-scale merchants to intrude in competition. The type of commodity (clothes, kerosene, and so on) cannot be increased in value through combination and transportation, while at the same time the volume of trade is so sporadic and low that only the one-man operation can derive a living from it. We might assume that wherever there exists an adequate margin of profit through combination and increase in scale, the large-scale firm will preempt this position. The leftovers, so to speak, go to the small middleman operation. On the other hand, these small-scale merchants are performing services which have a low cultural value among the local population. Thus the small-scale seller of goods and services fills a vacuum. He cannot be displaced by the large firms, since it would not be profitable for them to compete with him. At the same time, he serves the local community by providing necessary but socially disapproved of services.

Finally, the tribesmen interact amongst themselves--producers selling to household consumers. Since the fellah's trade is always in small lots (with the exception of livestock), most transactions in this sector are on a very small scale. Lack of capital and limited interest in the market characterize this group. Sellers seek to dispose of their product at whatever the prevailing price as quickly as possible. Buyers choose mainly in terms of quality of the commodity rather than price, which tends to be even--each seller listening to his neighbor seller and selling accordingly. There is very little differential in this group in product or price. The cause behind this lies,

townsmen were traders who carried their vegetables and flowers on foot or bus to distant parts of the regional market in order to achieve maximum profits. The Riffian seeks only to make an exchange in his local market in order that he might get back to the more important aspects of his life.

Such exchange, however, is not without calculation. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Berber goes to his local *suq* because it satisfies certain social needs. He likewise frequents the market because it offers him clear-cut economic advantage. It is here that he has acquaintances among the merchants, craftsmen and occupational specialists with whom he has certain guarantees, based on familiarity, that he will receive a fair price. Such assurance is absent in a foreign market. Invariably, the stranger pays more for a service or good than the regular customer. In the most important aspect of trade, that of livestock, this consideration is coupled with that of transportation. From the standpoint of seeking out the best price based on multiple competition, the larger the market, the better the prices. In the long run, the best price for animals exists in the larger markets and one knows beforehand that an animal sold in Had Ruadi or Arba Taurirt will fetch a lower price than at Beni Bu Iyash. Yet to sell in such a market the *fellah* is faced with almost insurmountable difficulties. Should he take his livestock--a goat tied across the back of his mule or a cow herded along on foot--to a market further than his local *suq*, he must return the animal home or be entirely

443 dependent on the prices existing in the market for that day.
438 On the other hand, if he is dissatisfied with the price in the
435 local market he can easily transport the beast home again, to
await a more propitious occasion.

443 I think that the major element which emerges from this
182 schematic presentation of the composition of the market and the
571 interaction of its various actors is that each fellah, as an
individual, plays a relatively minor role in the workings of
the market. The market brings together buyers and sellers,
but the fellah have a different orientation than the other
443 buyers and sellers. Stemming from this difference in orienta-
182 tion is a basic difference in the form of economic activity.
The primary concern of the professional merchant is to dispose
of his products on the market, hopefully at a profit. The pri-
mary concern of the fellah is to meet subsistence and social
needs. If he can do this by disposing of his crops or livestock
on the market, all the better. But the market as such does not
provide the dynamics of the Rif economy; the dynamics are pro-
vided by the impulses activated by the status economy.

105 a disproportionate share of the national income towards support-
648 ing the region. "On balance, the ex-Spanish zone brings little other than problems to the Moroccan administration and economy" (Ibid.:170).[1] Since it cannot be profitably exploited, the Rif is allowed to follow its own form of economic integration. This integration is based on an adaptation to the prevailing ecological and social conditions of the Rif. That the adaptation is successful is testified by its persistence.

105 In summary I shall sketch what seem to me the basic features of this economic system. I do not pretend that this is an exhaustive summation of all elements of the system nor is it adequate as a treatment of the new forms of economic organization which are emerging in the Rif (expanding wage labor, tourism, etc.). It does, however, serve as a guide towards understanding the major elements of this status economy and, it is hoped, deepens our perception of the economic life of nonindustrial society.

105 We may start with the element in the system which marks
43 the greatest point of departure from the economy of an industrial
182 society. Those resources of the fellah which are not devoted to subsistence are predominantly tied up in meeting needs arising from a combination of social and religious factors. Production

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[1] The same is said about the Kabylia in Algeria. Yet it is unlikely that independence in either country could have been achieved as quickly as it came without the assistance of these dissentient Berber groups. Unfortunately, once independence is achieved they become a burden to the urban-oriented leaders.

105 is not keyed to profit for the sake of capital accumulation or
43 reinvestment for expansion but rather to provide resources to
182 meet these needs. Motives for exchanges, transfers, consumption,
[152] etc. are based on 1) social obligations, 2) anticipation of spiritual or social reward, and 3) ritually prescribed ceremonies. These motives provide the dynamics of the internal economic
105 system. While there are markets in the Rif, the economy itself
443 is not integrated by the market. It is a society which Bohannan
182 and Dalton would characterize as consisting of "Communities with
[181] peripheral markets--that is, the institution of the market place is present, but the market principle does not determine acquisition of subsistence or the allocation of land and labor resources" (1965:5). Of course, this does not mean that markets are unimportant in the society. The market is an institutionalized way of bringing buyers and sellers together and redistributing resources. As such it merits our attention as much as non-market transactions. Yet it is organizationally distinct from our own economy in which "All goods and services, including the use of labor, land and capital are available for purchase in markets and have, therefore, a price; all forms of income derive from the sale of goods and services--wages, rent and interest, respectively, appearing only as different instances of price according to the items sold" (Polanyi 1957:247). In the Rif the market acts as only one, and not necessarily the most predominant, focal point for exchanges. Only by exploring the com-
[114] plete range of exchanges can we avoid the sort of ethnographic

105 443 182 114 blindness that led Benet to conclude: "Everything that is not domestically produced has, therefore, to be obtained from the market, through market transactions, and no exchange or commercial activities of any kind are attempted outside of these times and places. The market place has a monopoly on exchange transactions [amongst Berbers]" (1957:196).

105 443 441 182 434 438 The market itself is not the area of primary concern for the fellah. Professional merchants, of course, fall into another category. But there is little impetus for the growth of an indigenous merchant class. The merchant entrepreneur is, by definition, acting in a way which runs counter to the status economy. He is primarily concerned with devoting his capital to profit or income-producing investments. While the peasant comes to the market with commodities to exchange for money to buy other commodities, the merchant seeks to convert money into commodities which he can resell in order to acquire more money. Social and religious imperatives only interfere with the merchant's freedom of action.[1] Unlike transactions in the social sphere which perpetuate themselves into the future as part of a web of reciprocal obligations, the merchant seeks transactions which are impersonal and terminal at the moment of exchange. He is most at home in the suq, where these conditions are nearest to being achieved.

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[1] I do not mean to draw too close a parallel between the Protestant merchant and his Muslim counterpart. The Islamic business ethic still awaits its Weber.

6: Joseph E-5 (1965-1966) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3

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182 Yet at the same time, the merchant becomes increasingly isolated from the culture of the Rif and increasingly involved in the ideology of industrial society.

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182 Outside the marketplace, resources continue to be circumscribed by social strictures, credit is based on reputation, prestige is evoked through ceremony, while honor and shame guarantee each transaction. Bulls are killed to bring on rain, witches paid to remove evil eyes, and man continues an intensive dialogue with his external environment based on a cultural evaluation which provides a measure of both social and physical comfort.

7: Mikesell K-4,S (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3
Senhaja MX4

presence of an influential family of *shurfa*, alleged descendants of the Prophet, who encouraged a shift from Berber to Arabic speech. Rifian is spoken in the hamlet of the Aith-Azza, but the weekly market of Targist has functioned traditionally as a trading center for the Sanhajan tribes, especially Zarqat. The Aith Mazduwi also appear to be of mixed origin, for both the Sanhajan and Rifian dialects are spoken by this tribe.

Sanhajans and Ghmarans generally regard all tribes to the east of them as Rifian, but among the Aith Bu Yihyi and other tribes of the Kert and Moulouya valleys this appellation is restricted to the tribes of the basin of Wad Nkour. It is useful to think of a zone of transition between the "true Rif"—Aith Wariyaghar, Ibuqquyen, Aith Ammarth, Igzinnayen, Aith Tuzin, Thimsaman—and the eastern frontier of the northern zone. The Ulad Stut are intrusive bedawin, like the Khlut of the Atlantic littoral. The remaining tribes may be described as "eastern Rifians." Two minor confederations are recognized within this group. The first, "Iqar'ayen" in Rifian and "Gal'aya" in Arabic, includes five tribes: Aith Bu Ifrur, Aith Sidar, Imazujen, Aith Bu Gafar, and Aith Shikar. The second, called "Garet" or "Gart" in Arabic, is formed of Ibdharsen and Aith Bu Yihyi. The dialect of the Aith Iznasen is intelligible to most Rifians, but there seems to be general agreement that the Rif, even in a broad sense, does not extend beyond Wad Moulouya.

Land and Livelihood

In the total context of geography, northern Morocco should be described as an isolated and generally inhospitable area. Moving from the Atlantic coast toward the east, the traveler is confronted with an abrupt transition from alluvial plains and terraces to a wild and chaotic zone of steep slopes and narrow ridges. The eastern lowlands are more favorable from a physiographic point of view, but the Rif chain creates a rain shadow, and the tribesmen of the eastern Rif, Garet, and Gal'aya suffer from meager and erratic rainfall. Cut off to the south by the Rif chain and to the north by inhospitable coasts, northern Morocco cannot compare with Greece, Italy, southern France, or Andalusia as a breeding place for advanced civilization. It is a rampart and a place of refuge.

The tribesmen of northern Morocco share an agricultural heritage derived in part from contacts with Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, and Europeans. Farming methods are primitive, for the mountain tribes learned centuries ago how to grow the maximum amount of food on tiny terraces, and the size of their fields and the steepness of slopes discourage mechanization. Barley and wheat constitute the most important crops. Wherever water is available for irrigation, the cereals, which are dry-farmed, are supplemented by summer crops of maize, legumes, and vegetables. Horticulture provides precious additional food, and during the spring, when cereal stocks are low, raisins, figs, and nuts are staples. In the semiarid lowlands east of the Rif chain, only cereal farming is possible, and famine may be experienced when rains are meager or arrive too late. The great seasonal migration from this area toward the French farms of eastern Algeria resulted from an imbalance between population and food supply.

Variations in crop combinations and diet are partly conditioned by environmental factors, and hence will be considered in greater detail in chapter ii. A

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3
Senhaja MX4

few notes here will suffice to illustrate the range of difference. The Sanhajans are masters of terracing and irrigation, but in horticultural skill they yield to the Rifians, who are noted also for honey and grapes. The Ulad Stut, thanks to their bedawin origin, are expert in the preparation of milk products. The Ghmarans are northern Morocco's best fishermen, but their skill is limited to the use of skiffs and seines. The Sanhajans are most interested in freshwater fishing, and they may also be the best hunters in the northern zone. These points will be elaborated in chapter vi.

Cultural Uniformity and Diversity

In order to place northern Morocco in proper perspective, we must consider two classes of culture traits: those that are ubiquitous and those that are limited to certain parts of this zone. For example, the Rifian is in many respects quite different from the Ghmaran or Jbalan. He speaks a different language, has different ideas of honor and shame, wears his turban differently, and builds a different type of house. Yet as Moroccans the Rifians, Ghmarans, and Jbalans share ideas and objects that are rare or unknown in other parts of the Muslim world.

All Moroccans, at least in theory, are good Muslims. Islam does not confine itself to ideas and their influence on the spirit of man: it is a religion of force and authority, a system of law, and a basis of government. The influence of Islam is evident in institutions and patterns of behavior that affect the form and function of every village and farmstead. To say that Moroccans are Muslims is to assert that they share ideas and institutions common to the entire Muslim world. Yet it is also true that Islam in Morocco has many unusual features. It is a common saying that Berber culture constitutes the foundation of the Moroccan house, while Arab customs and religion are only the whitewash on the walls.[5]

A distinguishing feature of Moroccan Islam is the elaborate development of brotherhoods and the cult of saints. These heterodox developments seem in part to reflect pre-Islamic beliefs. The Berber tribesman, though he may be ignorant of Arabic, yields to no one in the belief that he is pious and correct. He prays, keeps the fast of Ramadan, and honors those of his tribe who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In this sense he is like all Muslims, but, as Hart aptly remarks, he retains local saints to comfort him and local jinns to plague and torment him.[6] One aspect of these beliefs is the superstition that relates to the sanctity of cemeteries and shrines. In chapter vii it will be shown that there is often a marked contrast between the plant cover of sacred land and that of profane land.

Berber kinship terminology, like that of the Arabs, is a bifurcate collateral type.[7] The terms for mother's brother and for father's brother are different, as are the terms for mother's sister and for father's sister. The inheritance of property follows the standard Maliki practice, which allots a share to each son equal to that falling to two daughters. Descent is patrilineal, and the number of pa-

[5] D. M. Hart, "Morocco's Saints and Jinns," *Tomorrow*, 7 (1959), 45–54.
[6] *Ibid*, p. 46.
[7] D. M. Hart, *Morocco: Subcontractor's Monograph* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), pp. 136a–140.

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

CHAPTER III

CULTURE HISTORY PRIOR TO EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

FOR THE POPULATIONS and civilizations that reached it, Morocco was a cul-de-sac. Every movement came up against the Atlantic barrier and was retarded by the hostile environment of the Sahara. During the Pleistocene epoch and, indeed, during the first millennia of Recent geologic time, Morocco was a redoubt in which outmoded ways of life perfected themselves in isolation. The descendants of the Neolithic farmers remained dependent on stone tools three thousand years after the Egyptians, at the other end of the Mediterranean, had begun to use metal. Basically, the Stone Age cultures still persist, in spite of Phoenician, Roman, Arab, and European influence.

The historic accounts of the Canary Islands are of special interest. When the Norman and Spanish conquerors reached the Canaries a few generations before the discovery of America, the islanders spoke a Berber dialect and still retained their Neolithic culture. They used stone tools, and fashioned implements from wood, horn, and shell. They produced crude and underfired pottery in the Neolithic style, and their textiles were plaited matting and basketry. Their clothing was of cured goatskin, and their houses were made of stone, pine timbers, and earth. They raised pigs, dogs, sheep, and goats, and grew barley and wheat. They knew how to preserve meat by drying and milk by making cheese. Add metal, weaving, and the crops and animals introduced from southwestern Asia and the Americas, and this outline of material culture is little different from that of an isolated Moroccan village of today.[1]

THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATIC CHANGE

A mass of circumstantial evidence suggests that Barbary has become drier since the time of the Roman occupation. The impressive ruins of Thamugadi (Timgad) and the great amphitheater of Thysdrus (el-Jem) now stand on desolate plains. The ancient seaports of Leptis Magna and Sabratha were found buried under an immense drift of sand. Mosaics and historical records tell of the presence in Roman Africa of elephants, lions, and other wild animals now confined to the tropical zone. Further examples of change presumed to be a result of desiccation could be cited, but these suffice to illustrate the type of evidence that impresses the traveler.

It cannot be denied that the landscape of northern Africa has changed since classical time, but the thesis of a climatic explanation of this change is difficult to defend. Most of the evident deterioration can be traced to neglect or destruction by man. Aqueducts, dams, and cisterns made possible the building of the now dead cities. With the collapse of the Pax Romana, marginal land dependent on irrigation went out of cultivation. Burning, cutting, and overgrazing

[1] Leonardo Torriani, *Die kanarischen Inseln und ihre Urbewohner;* trans. from the MS of 1590 by D. J. Wölfel (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1940), Vol. VI of *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Geographie und Völkerkunde.* C. S. Coon, in *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), pp. 36–40, calls attention to the Canary Islanders as "Berbers" unaffected by foreign influence.

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

favored the propagation of xerophytic and heliophilous plants, and thus enhanced the illusion of desiccation. The "tropical" animals pictured on Roman mosaics did not die out as a result of climatic change; they were exterminated by man. The last elephants probably disappeared in Roman time. Lions may have been in the Atlas Mountains until about 1900. Ostriches, antelopes, and other animals nearly extinct in the Sahara still survive along the upper reaches of the Saqiyah al-Hamra in Río de Oro. The arguments for and against desiccation in historic time have been debated at length, and the weight of evidence is against a significant change in climate.[1]

The Berbers

The autochthonous inhabitants of northern Africa are usually described as Berbers. In classical times this appellation, derived from Greek and Latin roots meaning "barbarian," was applied to individuals or groups living beyond the Orbis Romanus. Today Berber is applied as a general name, devoid of pejorative implication, to North Africans who are not Arabized. The people thus designated refer to themselves as *imazighen* (nobles). The European term serves a useful function if its application is determined by the persistence of Berber speech, but confusion results when it is given racial, moral, or psychological connotation. Romantic notions of the Berbers as "noble savages" may be found even in serious works.[2] The French had an instinctive liking for the Berbers, because they seemed more European than Oriental in physical appearance and mental outlook. But the policy of encouraging Berber languages, Berber law, and Berber traditions, as a means of checking Arab nationalism, had at best only temporary success.

The racial characteristics of the Berber-speaking peoples are far from uniform. In the Kabylie, Aurès, Rif, and Atlas mountains one may see dolichocephalic people, with blue or gray eyes, and light brown or even blond hair. Other Berber-speaking peoples are darker and have round heads. Many Berbers are of the classical Mediterranean type. The Tuareg form another group, tall and lean, with short bodies and long limbs. The physical characteristics of the indigenous peoples of northern Africa seem to have resulted from the crossing of several races during widely separated periods.[3]

The confusion surrounding the meaning of "Berber" is further complicated by the fact that French colonial policy called for a division of Morocco into Berber and Arab territories, each with a distinct system of local government and law.[4] In unreasoned protest against the implications of this policy, some authors, sympa-

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 35]

[1] There are many discussions of this problem: Stéphane Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: Hachette, 1913–1928), I, 44–99; Jean Despois, *La Tunisie orientale: Sahel et Basse Steppe* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1940), pp. 237 ff.; Rhoads Murphey, "The Decline of North Africa since the Roman Occupation: Climatic or Human?" Association of American Geographers, *Annals*, 41 (1951), 116–132; and K. W. Butzer, *Studien zum vor- und frühgeschichtlichen Landschaftswandel der Sahara* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1958), pp. 5–17.

[2] For an interesting example of Berber romanticism, see Edouard Brémond, *Berbères et arabes: la Berbérie est un pays européen* (Paris: Payot, 1950).

[3] C. S. Coon, "Tribes of the Rif," *Harvard African Studies*, 9 (1931); L. Cabot Briggs, "The Living Races of the Sahara Desert," Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, *Papers*, 28 (1958).

[4] As recently as September, 1956, pamphlets urging the Berber tribes to revolt against "Arab imperialism" were distributed in Morocco. The Moroccan police promptly established that these tracts had been typed and mimeographed on machines used by an organization known as the "Présence Française." For the text of one of the tracts and the Moroccan reaction to it, see *Al-Istiqlal*, September 7, 1956, and the *Tangier Gazette*, September 14, 1956.

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628 But in these less wild regions, the periods of calm are never-
•182 theless short and do not leave these rudimentary institutions
642 /241/ time to perfect themselves. Anarchy and fights by families infuriated by vengeances have never permitted the Riffians to know a government by regularly elected leaders, changed in
628 turn, or the use of common funds. Only the holy-war treasuries,
652 organized by pious establishments, existed at all times. Hate
721 for the Christian can indeed dominate the strongest feelings;
798 whatever may be the violence of the disputes that divide them,
182 the notables always agree enough to go shares in small sums of money intended for the purchase of bullets in order to go to aim at the detested soldiers of the "Peñon" /Rock/ of Alhucemas or Badès (1).

[113] 1. Compare A. Bernard, Les Confins algéro-marocains /The Algero-Moroccan Borders/, p. 89 and sqq.

000 XII. The republics of the Kabylie /Kabylia/. -- It is above all between the social organization of the Kabylie /Kabylia/ before the French conquest and that of the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ that it is possible to multiply the comparisons in order to find profound analogies under the apparent differences. It is easy, as a matter of fact, to see that the small republics of the Tichka or of the Jbel Kest, sequestered in the high valleys of the South of Morocco, and the ones that have grown and prospered on the summits of the Djurjura live with similar institutions, share the same positive and limited ideal, suffer from identical ills, and are subject to the same rules of existence, to the same laws of development.

The territory of the "ᶜarch" is, as we have seen, equivalent to that of a small "taqbilt" of the Sous; both form, in the free state, autonomous and often even independent political units. But in one of the regions the slight density of the population of a country where human life is difficult, in the other the

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634 This expansion of the religious forces smothers the free
792 political life of the mountain populations, and even when a
182 family head succeeds in dominating the neighboring villages and becoming amghar of an entire khoms, he remains the respectful servant of the holy personages who maintain in the tribes the tradition of Islam, hate of the Christian, and direct, without ever appearing, the debates of the little assemblies.

/295/ It is only where the grip of the marabouts and shorfa relaxes for a time and in the regions that are not entirely given over to private wars that the ambition of the minor amghars can be given free rein for some years. Indeed, we see them appear on the north versant of the chain of the Rif, out of the reach of the zaouias established on the summits, in the tribes of the Ghomara, among the Beni Bou Frah, the Beni Gmil, the Mestasa, and to the south of the Jbel Hammam, in the country of the Gzennaya at the sources of the Nkor, or in the tribe of the Beni Amret.

634 Although the internal life of these tribes at the end of the
619 nineteenth century is less well known to us than that of the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/, it is nevertheless possible to find again the conditions in which the amghars of the western Rif grew important, up to the moment when the effort attempted by ᶜAbd el Kerim /Abd-el-Krim/ to constitute a Riffian State made them disappear at a single blow.

619 The anarchy in the country and disturbances that occurred in
648 the tribe of the Boqqoya had made necessary, at the beginning of the reign of Moulay ᶜAbd el ᶜAziz, the sending of a strong harka of the Makhzen /makhzan/, and the organization of the tribes was entrusted to the kaid Boucheta el Baghdadi, of the guich /gish/ of the Sultan, who in our day has become Pasha of Fès /Fez/. The garrisons billeted in the old casbahs of Tafersit and Snada, supported by a small steamer of the sherifian fleet in the bay of Alhucémas, sufficed at this time to restore order. The
[614] command of the tribal "khoms" was then entrusted to the chiefs of the most powerful clans, named sheiks for the occasion. The dissensions of the mountain "khoms," which had previously ended

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175 against the Christians, the amghars, aided by the marabouts, try
721 to take back the power that escapes them; it is they who will
634 direct the revolt of 1924, which for a time will threaten the work
648 of the Riffian chief. Defeated in that supreme endeavor, they
669 will perish, the majority by poison or in the dungeons of Ajdir and Tamassint.

634 In spite of the real power that the amghars of the Rif can
554 succeed in obtaining, their authority nevertheless remains pre-
182 carious. Based entirely on force, born amidst the conflict of
578 unstable leffs, deprived of the support of oligarchic traditions, it exists only very rarely after the disappearance of the one who created it. The hostile forces directed by the anarchic clans and the marabouts rapidly stop their endeavor. The social material appears too rebellious; so the rough outline of personal power remains unfinished; the amghar succeeds in asserting himself only in his canton of origin; we do not see him succeed anywhere, by the force of his power alone, in breaking the narrow frontiers of the fraction, /297/ the boundaries of a leff, and in conquering a true
[721] tribe. ᶜAbd el Kerim alone in this region, carried by other forces,
[648] will succeed, thanks to the enthusiasm of the holy war, in establishing a powerful domination and in founding for a time a true Berbère /Berber/ state.

000 XIII. The chiefs of the Kabylie /Kabylia/. -- Masqueray has studied well the difficult conditions in which the authority of the soff chief whose ambition is to conquer supreme power in his tribe can develop in Kabylie /Kabylia/. The political state of the villages of the Djurjura /Djurdjura/, divided into two hostile parties, almost always balanced, but which are ceaselessly renewed and do not have the permanence of the leffs of the Masmouda, is no more favorable than the anarchic Rif for the establishment of a strong and stable personal power.

Nevertheless the analogies between the Kabylie /Kabylia/ and the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ remain numerous. Rich and brave, the future amghar in the Djurjura begins by being only the head of a family or of a soff. When his party wins, it remains for him to have his effective superiority accepted by the members of

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631 of the tribes of the vicinity. ᶜAbd el Kerim can easily tame the
669 revolts of the Rif fomented by the minor amghars of the Ghomara,
648 /403/ jealous of the development of his power; soon he completes his successes by the conquest of the Jbel and makes his rival Raisouli perish in prison.

175 Four years sufficed to make of the son of the cadi of Ajdir the
631 independent Sultan of the north of Morocco, who keeps the
554 armies of Spain at bay; carried away by his ambition, by the en-
[648] thusiasm and cupidity of his entourage, ᶜAbd el Kerim then dreams for an instant of conquering the towns of the Maghreb and becoming master of all the Mussulmans of Morocco, whose eyes turn toward him with growing admiration. Indeed, each day that passes increases his prestige; he becomes, in the eyes of western Islam, a new Moustapha /Mustafa/ Kemal; his name is known from the Indies to America, and people follow his victories and projects with a passionate interest; the large countries of Europe are stirred up by the importance that he is acquiring and, according to their interests, secretly desire his success or hope for his ruin.

175 A few weeks of well-directed military efforts moreover suffice
631 to get rid of the "Riffian State." But the conditions under which
•182 this Berbère /Berber/ kingdom, so rapidly built up and at the same
648 time so fragile, suddenly collapses enable us to see its internal structure clearly.

During the first phase of the war, the struggle between the Rif, France, and Spain was carried on to the boundary of the tribes conquered and governed by the Beni Ouriaghel; so the efforts of two large modern armies remained in vain because the members of the Riffian Makhzen /makhzan/ always succeeded in constraining all the populations of the mountains of the north of Morocco to continue the holy war, the "jihad," without sparing their forces; but when the territory of the Beni Ouriaghel itself is threatened, the warriors of ᶜAbd el Kerim's tribe all abandon at the same time their external commands in the tribes of the Jbala and the Wergha in order to come to defend their own homes; the grip exerted by the tribal brothers of the "Sultan of the Rif" on all the small

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/403 cont./ mountain communities relaxes for an instant; the circumstances that then lead the French column of Colonel Corap at Targist to the heart of the enemy country in a single jump cause the complete ruin of the political edifice built up with so much energy by the chief of the Beni Ouriaghel; the organized state whose plan he had outlined with so much boldness /404/ was succeeded in two days by an inert mass of tribes without strength.

Finally, the very circumstances of the moving capitulation of ʿAbd el Kerim abandoned by his subjects project a bright light on the nature of the little state that he succeeded in creating in four years of effort.

While the Beni Ouriaghel succumb or give way by the number, in defending their villages, the companions of the Riffian chief, who are the inhabitants of Ajdir, from whom he procured his ministers, flee with their wives into a mountain village; ʿAbd el Kerim himself, having taken refuge at Snada with a marabout, overwhelmed by his defeat, understands the futility of any resistance, and when he agrees to surrender by placing himself under France's protection, the last wish that he formulates illustrates better than a long study the humble origin of the movement: "We are," he says to our officers sent to lead him to submit, "simple agriculturalists. Our desire is to be authorized to live together from our work on a piece of land of the Makhzen." If it had been possible in other, less troubled times to grant the wish of the conquered one, the "Sultan of the Rif" would have been seen with all his Makhzen -- the sons of the Aït Arbaʿin of Ajdir -- leading in some distant country, with resignation and without too much surprise, the obscure existence of a Berbère /Berber/ hamlet of plowmen.

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IV. Fragility of the power of the temporal leaders. -- From the tenth century to our day, the great political laws of the life of the Maghreb have therefore not changed. Whether it is a matter of the Empire of the Fatimides /Fatimids/ or of the ephemeral kingdom of ʿAbd el Kerim, of the chiefs of the Atlas of the fourteenth century or of those of our time, the ambitious men who